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ABSTRACT
Simon M. Hoellerbauer: Reconceptualizing Civil Society and its Strength
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson)
What is Civil Society? Can we assess how strong it is? Using the problems present
conceptualizations of civil society entail as a point of departure, this work develops a
definition that strips civil society of its normative assumptions and functional form and
fits better with the reality we observe. Civil society can be thought of as a space between
the state, the market, and the family that can be divided into different sectors based on
the goals of the civil organizations that inhabit it. The strength of each sector can be
assessed by gauging how cohesive civil society organizations within that sector are, how
embedded they are in the social fabric of society, and how developed their bureaucratic
capital is. This work then sketches out how this approach can be used to analyze civil
society in the United States and Armenia. In sum, it presents the basis for a new research
agenda aims to investigate the relationship between civil society and democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil society is a concept that has come to take a central role among scholars of de-
mocratization and policy makers interested in furthering development abroad. Although
the term has a long history, the concept of civil society was first linked to democracy by
Tocqueville in Democracy in America, although he did not use the term itself (White-
head, 2004, 26). The more agency-focused literature on democratization and democratic
consolidation—including democratic theorists—has highlighted the powerful role civil
society plays in political development, although they argue it does so in diverse ways
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Diamond, 1999; War-
ren, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). In these accounts,
civil society serves as a democratizing force, ensuring democratic change or democratic
stability, depending on the context. Scholars, both theorists and empiricists, who have
looked at civil society itself, however, have not been as quick to affirm this position (En-
carnacio´n, 2003; Armony, 2004; Lorch and Bunk, 2017; Teets, 2014; Ziegler, 2010; Spires,
2011; Dimitrovova, 2010; Cheskin and March, 2015). They nevertheless also argue force-
fully about the importance of civil society, with a more nuanced focus.
A central issue is the conceptual confusion that exists around the term. As one scholar
of civil society put it, “the meaning of the term has varied over time and the framing of
civil society has depended on intellectual tradition and social reality” (Alagappa, 2004a,
26). Another stated it more bluntly:
Suffice it to say that we are still without a single, unified and consensual,
meaning for the term. To this day, most writers on ‘civil society’ leave me
uncertain whether trade unions occupy a central or a marginal role; whether
‘the media’ are to be viewed as internal or external; whether the neutral
rule of law is an essential precondition and support, or an utopian ideal that
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civil society activists should use to critique existing strictures of political ma-
nipulation; and whether political democracy sprouts from, coexists with, or
threatens to pollute the dense associative principles of civil society. (White-
head, 2004, 27-28)
This confusion has led some to call for ignoring the term entirely: “To rediscover civil
society, to retrieve an archaic concept, may be an interesting exercise in intellectual
history but it evades the real political challenges at the end of the twentieth century”
(Kumar, 1993, 391-392). This call has not been heeded, and civil society remains a
buzzword for policy developers and researchers of democracy. Understandably, as the
relationship between society, citizens, and politics is worth studying in-depth.
My goal in this paper is not to engage in too much depth the theoretical literature
on civil society, and I do not directly debate the merit of this or that conceptualization.
This is first and foremost an empirically focused work, and I do not seek to develop civil
society as a model or approach to politics (see Baker, 2002). Like all concepts, civil
society as an idea only exists because we use it and because it is useful in analysis. The
confusion regarding civil society is impactful, as it complicates empirical analysis, making
it hard to adjudicate between the many theorized effects of civil society. In addition, and
most crucially, this confusion makes it difficult to find an accurate way to assess civil
society in quantitative or qualitative ways, leading to a decidedly small but very diverse
array of civil society measurement strategies, which are often not as concept-driven as
they should be. The empirical reality is important, in turn, because a focus solely on
theory may lead us to make statements such as the one made by Arato and Cohen (2017)
when they say that “populist movements and political religion are in but not necessarily
of civil society” (283). To avoid such confusing phrasing, the concept of civil society
must, to a certain extent, be torn from the grasping hands of theory, which has shaped it
considerably, and must be freed from the normative connotations imposed on it by both
theorists and empiricists. Only then can we begin to discuss ways of assessing different
aspects of civil society.
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My main aim in this paper is to establish a new way of thinking about civil society
strength, which I assess via three dimensions and a conditioning element. Along the way,
however, it is necessary first to redefine civil society, strip it of its normative implications,
and make it nonfunctional in definition. I accomplish this by forming civil society as the
space between the state, the market, and the family. This space can be divided into
sectors and subsectors, each made up of organizations with similar goals. This division
of the civil society space is necessary in order to establish the non-monolithic nature of
civil society. The three main dimensions of civil society strength are sector- and subsector-
based: cohesiveness speaks to how well connected and cooperative groups within a sector
are; embeddedness speaks to how well the sector is situated within the overall framework
of society; and bureaucratic capital speaks to how well run the organizations in a sector
are. Finally, the civil society environment, which can also vary at the sector level, impacts
strength by making it harder or easier for groups to be cohesive and embedded. This
paper thus provides a new language for speaking about civil society and civil society
strength.
This article is constructed in the following way, roughly following the path of concep-
tualization laid out by Gerring (2012, 131): the second section presents a brief review of
the literature on civil society, discussing both the term and the concept, with an aim to
highlight the problems the inherent opaqueness of the term presents to empirical studies.
In the third section, I explain how existent quantitative approaches to measuring civil so-
ciety present flawed images of civil society. Then, in the fourth, I lay out a more nuanced,
less normative conceptualization of civil society and sketch out a new way of thinking
about civil society strength built off of that new conceptualization. Fifth, I demonstrate
the utility of my proposed assessment strategy by turning to two brief vignettes—focusing
on the United States and Armenia—that demonstrate variation along the different com-
ponents of strength. Finally, I conclude and present the way forward for this research
agenda.
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ON CIVIL SOCIETY
Although the historical development of the term and concept of civil society is not
the main point of this section or of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that
the scholarly and theoretic understanding of civil society, as expressed by Alagappa
above, has changed considerably overtime.1 Hobbes and Locke both use the phrase “civil
society” but did so to refer to what nowadays we term political society (Whitehead,
2004, 25). The economists of the Scottish Enlightenment—Adam Ferguson chief among
them—were the first to position civil society as a sphere somewhat independent from
or opposite the state, but tied it solidly to the market, which was the epicenter of early
state-independent operations (Whitehead, 2004, 25; Alagappa, 2004a, 27-28). Hegel took
a similar approach to the topic, giving it a structure heavily based on guilds and unions
and positioning the market-situated concept as fully separate from the state and family
(Alagappa, 2004a, 27). Although Alexis de Tocqueville, writing at a similar time his
study of democratic development in the United States, was the first theorist of civic
associationism to connect it clearly with democracy, the theory of civil society would not
come around again to this connection until much later. Marx, for whom civil society was
still intricately tied up with the market, cast civil society as a stumbling block to the
proletariat revolution, a force that had subjugated the state and that had to be cast aside
(Alagappa, 2004a, 28). Gramsci, although starting from a similar Marxist background,
twisted the discussion around civil society, seeing it “as providing a solution” to the
political, social, and cultural problems posed by capitalist society (Alagappa, 2004a, 29).
Contemporary empirical approaches in political science in the realm of democrati-
1See Cohen and Arato (1992), Chapter 1 of Howell and Pearce (2001), Warren (2001), Baker (2002),
Burnell and Calvert (2004), and the Introduction of Alagappa (2004b) for a series of reviews of the
history of the term and concept.
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zation, which have incorporated elements from both Tocqueville and Gramsci, can be
divided into two camps. These focus mainly on function2: Green (2002, 456) explains
a “sociological version” and “political version”; Uhlin (2009) describes “recreational” vs
“advocacy” civil societies; Baker (2002, 64) differentiates between “republican” and “in-
strumentalist” approaches.3. In short, the divide refers to those who conceptualize civil
society as a place for the inculcation of democratic values and those who conceive of it
as a counterbalance to the state. On the one hand neo-Tocquevillans—chief among them
Putnam (1993, 2000)—emphasize the ability of the interaction of people in the social
space to instill and teach democratic values. Scholars on the other side of the debate
underline the ability of civil society groups to work as a check on the state. This leads
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 66) to proclaim that “high organizational
density ... is an important counterweight to the state apparatus,” Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2005, 31) to explain that civil society can help solve the collective action problem
during rebellion and protect against state-takeover by hostile forces afterward, and Bunce
and Wolchik (2011) to theorize that strong cohesive relationships between civil society
and opposition groups in hybrid regimes can force authoritarian leaders out of power.
This attitude is not confined solely to empirical studies, however; Arato and Cohen affirm
that “autonomous civil society is the indispensable couterpart of a modern democratic
constitutionalist polity” (2017, 284).
Of course, what civil society does may not be connected so directly to what it is.
Nevertheless, implicit or explicit functional definitions—if such definitions are attempted
at all—of civil society abound, especially in the study of democratization. Although some
scholars contest the formulation of civil society as uniformly beneficial to democracy—see
2Although function informs make-up, which I discuss in the next paragraph.
3Armony (2004, 24) lays out three types: “social capital,” “third sector,” and “public sphere.” Al-
though the distinctions are theoretically useful, third sector civil society—also used by Anheier (2004)—
and public sphere civil society—a version of which is championed by Jur¨gen Habermas—belong to the
same family, as both see civil society as a force to counter the state. They do conceptualize distinct
make-ups of civil society, however.
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Armony (2004), Berman (1997), Bermeo (2003), Huntington (2000 [1968]), and Holland
and Palmer-Rubin (2015)—the prevailing trend within the democratization literature is
still to emphasize the positive nature of civil society: the “normative backdrop [to civil
society] is a liberal-democratic one” (Baker, 2004, 63).4,5 In this vein, scholars work back-
ward from function. Thus, in the balance schools of thought, scholars such as Lisa Raker
and Jean-Francois Bayart only count organizations that interact with the state as belong-
ing to civil society (White, 2004, 8). Putnam (1993, 2000), on the other hand, considers
all social organizations as part of civil society. In the context of democratic consolidation,
Diamond (1999) explicitly includes only democratic organizations within his conceptu-
alization of civil society. Alagappa (2004a) states that only “groups that take collective
action in pursuit of the public good” pertain to civil society (32). Unsurprisingly, some
theorists and empiricists have pushed back against these definitions, pointing out that
such a “restrictive” approach to civil society is problematic, muddles analysis, and biases
results (Armony, 2004, 9). In addition, the study of civil society under authoritarian rule
has pointed out that the liberal democratic conceptualization is flawed, as civil society
can exist with—and indeed co-exist with and/or support—authoritarian rulers (Lorch
and Bunk, 2017; Cheskin and March, 2015; Teets, 2014; Spires, 2011; Ziegler, 2010; Dim-
itrovova, 2010).
It is also critical to note here that discussion within the literature reigns as to whether
civil society is inherently a Western concept. Gellner (1994) claims that it is, although
Alagappa (2004b), in his edited volume on civil society in Asia, retorts that civil society
4Interestingly, whereas Armony, Bermeo, and Huntington provide somewhat broad-seated explana-
tions that civil society can have destabilizing effects (in the case of Huntingon and Bermeo) and can
contain non-democratic elements (Armony), Berman and Holland and Palmer-Rubin provide a more
mechanism focused look at how this may occur: Berman points out recreational organizations that had
abandoned politics were ripe for manipulation and co-optation by the Nazis in Weimar Germany, and
Holland and Palmer-Rubin point out that civil society organizations can actually function as brokers for
clientelism within weakly democratic and hybrid regimes.
5Gellner (See 1994, Ch. 1) for an assessment of why this normative connotation and functional form
was so valuable after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Normatively and theoretically, this idea of civil
society was incredibly important. Ideas inform actions, just as actions inform ideas. However, to use
this idea of civil society as the definition of civil society is empirically false, as I discuss in this section.
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may not look the same everywhere, although the concept remains useful. The issue
again revolves around functional definitions and conceptualizations, as they are difficult
to apply to all cases.
Perhaps in order to avoid debates such as these, a trend in the literature has been to
define civil society as a location, as a “sphere”—or spheres in the case of Fraser (1990)—
that is situated between the market and the state, the private sector and the state, or the
famly, the market, and the state (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Bernhard
et al., 2015; Uhlin, 2009).6 Civil society has also been put into network terms by Skocpol
and Fiorina (1999) and Henderson (2003). Yet these conceptualizations still mostly fall
into the trap of casting civil society as a more or less monolithic entity.
The scholars of international assistance have been the ones, almost by accident, to
review and critique the traditional civil society paradigm most effectively. Although still
hamstrung by the normative assumptions built into a lot of their work, focusing on the
factors that facilitate or impede the strengthening and growth of civil society has allowed
them to point out empirically what some political theorists have been exploring for some
time, namely that civil society is not monolithic. Mendelson and Glenn (2002), investi-
gating the impact of foreign assistance on NGOs, find that civil society thus promoted
can be disconnected from the people, a similar theme that runs through the work of
Ishkanian (2008, 2014). Henderson (2003) shows that civil society that received funding
gains a different character from the which does not, with funded civil society growing
closer together, but also more insular. Bush (2015) explains that democracy assistance
changes the nature of civil society organizations that seek donor funding, making them
more Western in appearance and structure. Although she does not discuss the impact of
this assistance on other organizations within civil society, Aksartova (2009) does, echo-
ing Henderson’s earlier work by explaining that this funding can destabilize other civil
6Malena and Heinrich (2007, 340) interestingly cast civil society as an “arena” due to its interactive
nature.
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society organizations that do not receive funding. While this work is valuable in and
of itself, and while much still remains to be explored about how civil society promotion
affects civil societies as a whole, these studies crucially chip at the idea that civil society
can be seen as strong or weak as a whole, without considering its constituent parts. Al-
though these studies themselves do not take the step back required to fully reassess the
sometimes falsely self-reinforcing nature of the civil society literature, they help realize
its necessity. This, along with the literature on undemocratic civil society (e.g. Bermeo,
2003; Armony, 2004), serves to demonstrate the danger and the hollowness of the more
functional approaches to civil society.
8
ON THE ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Two broad themes, related to the above discussion, run through the assessment of
civil society. The monolithic approach to civil society endemic to the democracy-civil
society literature is replicated in the measurement of civil society. Furthermore the
confusion about the meaning of the term is also replicated in these measures, making it
quite difficult to determine what is captured by these measurements. The goal of this
section is to review several civil society assessment strategies and initiatives, in order to
demonstrate what work must still be done. Although some are also methodologically
questionable and many of the quantitative measures are not available on a large scale,
the aim is to focus more on the conceptual problems inherent in these measures.
Although the dearth of quantitative measures of civil society in the social sciences
inspired Anheier to lament their lack in his 2004 book, in which he develops a mea-
surement scheme for civil society, recent times have seen a significant proliferation of
quantitative approaches. The one measure still in consistent use today that predates An-
heier’s complaint is Freedom House’s Nations in Transit measure (Freedom House, 2018).
The Nations in Transit scores seek to track the democratic development of the Eastern
and Central European and Eurasian countries that emerged out of the collapse of the
Soviet Union.7 One of the subscores within the Nations in Transit project pertains to
civil society. As all of the Freedom House scores, values on each dimensions are assigned
by country experts, with editorial input from Freedom House. Country report authors
and experts are asked to answer a series of questions on civil society and give a score
between 1 and 7.
7Except for, interestingly, Mongolia, which was dropped after the first three editions of NIT as
Freedom House “felt that the logic of the NIT findings was strengthened when [they] limited the countries
to those that were located in Europe or were part of the Soviet Union” (Puddington, 2015).
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Even aside from the potential for bias in expert surveys—and the editorial control of
Freedom House—The Nations in Transit civil society score is highly problematic. First,
it creates an image of civil society that is not based in empirical reality. It “[a]ssesses
the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and
financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function;
the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy
process” (Freedom House, 2018), implicitly pointing to an understanding of civil society
based on non-governmental organizations, which excludes many groups active in the civil
society space. Freedom House’s understanding of civil society, in the line of Diamond,
also excludes certain organizations whose values do not reflect democratic principles.
with one of the questions posed to experts asking: “Is society free of excessive influence
from extremist and intolerant nongovernmental institutions and organizations?” The
questions themselves—which range from “Is civil society vibrant?” to “Is the education
system free of political influence and propaganda”—betray a scattered conceptualization
of the concept. This makes it hard to identify both what this measure actual seeks to
capture and what the expected effect of this measured quantity is intended to be.
Another, much more recent, expert-survey-based approach is the Varieties of Democ-
racy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2017; Pemstein et al., 2017). Among the over
300 indicators—each of which are created by treating them as latent scores in a Bayesian
item response theory (IRT) model with inputs from a large number of expert coders—are
ten that pertain to civil society. In contrast to Freedom House, the V-Dem project takes
a very broad approach to civil society, declaring that
The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere
and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective inter-
ests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs
include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiri-
tual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social
movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental
organizations. (Coppedge et al., 2017a, 61-62)
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Although civil society is still conceived of as one entity, this approach acknowledges the
complexities of the term.
V-Dem uses the ten civil society indicators to create two indexes designed to measure
civil society. The first, the Core Civil Society Index, is formed by a Bayesian factor
analysis of the CSO entry and exit, CSO repression, and CSO participatory environment
indicators (Bernhard et al., 2015). This measure is designed to show how “robust”
civil society is, that is to say, the extent to which “civil society is able to establish
autonomy from the control of the state and that citizens pursue their collective interests
actively” (Bernhard et al., 2015, 10). Although clearly stated and methodologically
advanced, questions remain about what this measure is designed to show. What does
robustness actually mean? Is a robust civil society one that counterbalances the state?
Does autonomy from the state imply an effective civil society? Although Bernhard et
al. explain their desire to create a “single convenient indicator that captures the relative
strength of civil society across observations,” it is unclear what the connection is between
civil society strength and robustness. The constituent indicators do not provide much
enlightenment: while they establish that this measure does measure what Bernhard et
al. term robustness, it is difficult to understand how these indicators connect to civil
society strength on a conceptual and theoretical basis.
The second V-Dem measure of civil society, the Civil society participation index is
unfortunately even more conceptually muddled (Coppedge et al., 2017a, 61-62). Con-
fusingly, it seems to answer a series of tangentially related questions: “Are major CSOs
routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs;
are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within
party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?” The con-
nection between participation in CSOs and how CSOs participate in the policy-making
process is not well established. Even less clear is how candidate nomination, which ranges
from selection done “exclusively by party leaders” to selection “by constituency groups
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or direct primaries” is connected to the other three questions, with the link tenuous at
best (Coppedge et al., 2017a, 134).8 The Varieties of Democracy provides a very useful
tool for describing civil society around the world, on a much larger scale than has ever
been possible before. Its contribution is invaluable. But its measures sprout conceptual
cracks.
Turning away from expert surveys somewhat, the most conceptually robust measure of
civil society is arguably the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (Malena and Heinrich, 2007).
Based on the CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond (Anheier, 2004), the CCSI measures
civil society along four dimensions: structure, environment9, values, and impact. Civil
societies are assessed on these four dimensions with a combined 74 indicators based on
a diverse array of statistical and qualitative sources and evaluated, ideally, by country
civil society representatives (Malena and Heinrich, 2007, 348-349). The measure is not
very methodologically robust. While the indicators used nominally remain the same, the
“holistic” motivation of the CCSI makes it hard to reproduce across cases or years, and
the sources can change based on the context and availability of data for each country
(Anheier, 2004, 35-37; Malena and Heinrich, 2007, 341, 347). Granted, the goal of the
CCSI is not necessarily to function as a quantitative measure in regression analysis;
instead, it should serve as a tool for civil society organizations and donors to assess
civil society. In the light of the theme for this section, the CCSI provides two key
advancements. First, the CCSI crucially does acknowledge that non-democratic groups
must be included in any assessment of civil society (Malena and Heinrich, 2007, 341). In
addition, Anheier points out the necessity of examining civil society at different levels
of analysis: “because a country has a pronounced presence of voluntary organizations in
8V-Dem also includes a Diagonal Accountability Index, which “covers the range of actions and mech-
anisms that citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), and an independent media can use to hold the
government accountable” (Coppedge et al., 2017a, 79-80; see also Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt and Mechkova,
2017). This expands the focus beyond civil society and still uses the core civil society index to mea-
sure the civil society component of diagonal accountability, thus simply shifting the problem instead of
addressing it.
9Called “space” in Anheier (2004)
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the field of human rights or some other area does not mean that it has a well-developed
civil society overall” (2004, 31).
Conceptual concerns nevertheless persist. At various points, “strength,“ “state,” and
“health” of civil society are equated, yet it seems that the first is an active measure, the
second a descriptive one, and the third an evaluative one. The relation between the four
dimensions is also not entirely clear. To what extent do values tie into strength? To
what extent does impact measure the outcome of the other three dimensions?
The most difficult obstacle for the application of the CCSI is the shear amount of
work and organization involved. Over a series of three waves between 2000 and 2010, the
CIVICUS organization managed to describe the civil societies of 75 different countries,
although not all countries were included in each wave, making it difficult to track change
over time. The intractability of the process, and the potential for pro-NGO bias, led CIVI-
CUS to produce another measure of civil society, the Civil Society Enabling Environment
Index (Fioramonti and Kononykhina, 2015, 473). Based on CIVICUS’ conceptualization
of civil society as an arena where citizens interact, the enabling environment is defined
as “a set of conditions that impact on the capacity of citizens (whether individually or
in an organized fashion) to participate and engage in the civil society arena in a sus-
tained and voluntary manner” (Fioramonti and Kononykhina, 2015). Using quantitative
sources to evaluate the “socio-economic” (15 sources), “socio-cultural” (6 sources), and
“governance” (32 sources) environments, the Enabling Index attempts to assess the ca-
pacity of civil society organizations to act in order to achieve their aims.10 The power of
this measure is that it involves not only the legal environment of civil society (see Green
2002) but also cultural and economic factors that may impact civil society development.
The problem—although the realizations that adjudicating between which groups belong
in civil society and which do not is fruitless and that the environment plays a large role
10The actual formula for calculating the Enabling Environment Index weights the three dimensions
so that the governance dimension provides the same amount of information as the two other dimensions
combined.
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in determining civil society capacity are well-founded—is that abandoning all references
to civil society organizations may also lead to misleading results. It is quite possible that
civil society groups are “stronger” in nominally “weaker” environments due to charac-
teristics of those groups themselves, and vice-versa.
A similar environment-based measure, although one that includes more references
to the actual groups that the civil society space contains, is the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) CSO Sustainability Index (USAID, 2016). The
Sustainability Index aims to evaluate civil society along seven dimensions: legal environ-
ment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastruc-
ture, and public image. A country’s score is drawn up by a panel of at minimum eight
representatives from that country’s civil society. These representatives debate a series
of indicators provided by USAID and then come to a decision on scores on the seven
dimensions.
In contrast to CIVICUS’ Enabling Environment Index, the Sustainability Index, as
the name implies, captures the health of civil society, although the aim is still to make
claims about civil society’s ability to act given certain structural conditions. In this way,
it faces some of the same difficulties as the Enabling Environment Index. In addition, sus-
tainability could vary within different groupings of civil society. Furthermore, and more
troubling, sustainability as seen from the donor perspective and from the persecutive of
those organizations that receive funds could, as Aksartova (2009); Bush (2015); Hender-
son (2003); Ishkanian (2008, 2014); Mendelson and Glenn (2002) investigate, actually be
negatively correlated with capacity for action.
Although much of the work on assessing civil society in the context of democratization
has been qualitative in nature, little of this work has been conceptually—with respect
to civil society—rigorous, making it difficult to fully analyze the approaches taken by
researchers without also analyzing their work overall.11 While Rueschemeyer, Stephens
11Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2008) do provide a way of assessing civil society in a qualitative way,
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and Stephens (1992), for example, present a definition of civil society, they do not provide
a clear avenue for evaluating its strength, beyond stating that a denser civil society should
be better able to counteract the state (6).12 Although qualitative work is valuable, if the
researchers do not clearly conceptualize what effective—in whatever way they hypothesize
it should be—civil society should look like, it is easy to fall into the logical fallacy that
a “successful” outcome per force implies a “successful” civil society.
As this review has shown, existing measures struggle to accommodate the conceptual
fuzziness of civil society and often end up measuring something different than intended.
A clearer conceptualization of civil society is needed before it can be possible to speak
of assessment strategies.13
although it speaks more to a civil society’s relationship to the state. They examine two dimensions, self
organization—which indicates how independent civil society groups are—and mode of engagement—
how civil society groups interface with the state. Importantly, they apply this concept to different states
within Brazil. But this measure is not directly related to this topic here.
12Civil society density is not a measurement strategy I assess here. It has been pointed out repeatedly
that simply counting civil society organizations is misleading and depends on a very clear idea of what
organizations should be counted or not. See Encarnacio´n (2003) for a study of the link between civil
society density and democratization.
13It should also be noted that these measures are almost exclusively used as predictors, explanatory
variables, or controls. Bailer, Bodenstein and Heinrich (2012) is one of the few works that explicitly
looks at civil society as an outcome in a quantitative way. A lot of work remains to be done in order to
confirm what factors impact various aspects of civil society.
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A NEW APPROACH TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS STRENGTH
From the above, it is reasonable to conclude that civil society makes the most sense as
a space—attempting to adjudicate between who and who does not belong to civil society
can lead to arbitrary decisions and to biased conclusions about how “civil society” behaves
and how it impacts political processes. Also from the above, it is fairly straightforward
to conclude that we need a more theory-, concept-driven approach to measuring civil
society strength. In this section, I first introduce a novel way of thinking about civil
society. I then use that new conceptualization to conceive a new approach to civil society
strength.
Reconceptualizing Civil Society
It seems clear from the previous discussion that if civil society is to be useful—
or agreeable—as a concept, it must be separated from normative evaluations. We are
interested only in the structure—the bones, the flesh, the organs, the nerves—and not yet
in how the structures interact—the different organ systems, the flows of hormones that
regulate the interaction among different parts of the body.14 In effect, what is needed is
a purely mechanical definition and conceptualization. The rest can come later. In this
section I lay out such a mechanical definition. The goal is to provide us with a language
with which to discuss civil society that is as free of normative claims as is possible.
In accordance with much of the recent civil society literature, I conceptualize civil
society as the nebulous space that exists between the state, the family, and the market
(the private sector) (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Anheier, 2004; Malena
and Heinrich, 2007; Uhlin, 2009; Bernhard, Tzelgov, Jung, Coppedge and Lindberg,
14I am not advocating a functional approach to civil society. This is for illustrative purposes only.
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2015).15,16 I say this space is nebulous, as it its bounds are malleable and it is negative in
definition; it is everything the three pillars of society are not.17 The civil society space
is populated by civil society actors—people, not necessarily citizens, who may or may
not be in the same physical space; that is to say, civil society actors can exist online—
who congregate in civil society organizations where they interact with other civil society
actors. Although somewhat tautological, civil society actors are those individuals who
are active in the civil society space. This means that individuals can move into and out of
the space.18 At any one time, civil society actors can be involved with any number of civil
society organizations. Civil society organizations are not just collections of civil society
actors—just as the state can take on a life of its own independent of the individuals who
make up the ruling regime, so can civil society organizations. Civil society actors and
civil society organizations are active in the civil society space via civil society actions—
activities that bring them closer to their goal. Civil society actions can be workshops
and seminars, tournaments, letter writing campaigns, or outreach programs.19
In a departure from the majority of the literature, however, I conceive of the civil
society space as one divided into sectors and subsectors. The idea that civil society can
15To emphasize this point: civil society is not a thing. It is not tangible, and thus not really important
without interpretation. It is a space, occupied by things that are tangible, which are important.
16Defining civil society by what it is, or rather, where it is, rather than by what it does, helps alleviate
concerns that the concept applies only to Western countries. Functional definitions of civil society are
almost always unavoidably Western.
17This also implies that these three pillars can apply pressure on civil society.
18As seen below in the section on civil society strength, the extent to which and ease with which
individuals flit into and out of the space could be an important characteristic.
19Protest belongs to civil society, as civil society can express itself via protest—in other words, protest
is a form of civil society action (Alagappa, 2004b, 3). Including protest within civil society does not
mean they cannot be studied separately; the goal is to avoid only including organizations with the civil
society space. Protest—although the extent to which it is spontaneous or organized matters—is an
expression of civic interest in an outcome and by design implies association. Civil society actors can pull
individuals into the civil society space for protest. Civil society actors are not the only actors who can
pull individuals into the civil society space, however; convincing evidence shows that political elite can
play a large role in shaping protest (see Reuter and Robertson, 2015). This idea demonstrates that the
degree to which civil society actors and organizations are connected to individuals in the greater society
then matters for certain aspects of civil society.
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be divided in meaningful ways is not new, of course. Anheier (2004), in his presentation
of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation’s Civil Society Diamond discusses
the meso and micro levels of analysis, stating that the measurement scheme he proposes
could be applied “a particular segment or sub-field [of civil society]” and “one specific
organization or one specific setting“ (29). He does not address in any systematic way,
nor identify, these segments or sub-fields, and does not explain how they relate to the
civil society space as a whole. White (2004) also identifies “the need to distinguish
between different types or sectors of civil society,” but does not offer a systematic way to
distinguish between them (10). Nevertheless, both underline the necessity of recognizing
that civil society is not monolithic; in many cases to speak of civil society as a whole is
“meaningless” (White, 2004, 11).
Fraser (1990), responding to Habermas’ concept of the “public sphere,” goes even
further by arguing that casting civil society as one entity makes it difficult to observe
and analyze the conflicts and interactions within it (66-67). In effect, the various parts
of civil society may be more important—and certainly more interesting—than the whole.
In addition, adapting her reasoning to the case at hand, it is possible that donors treating
civil society as if it were one entity could be damaging in a causal way, to different aspects
or characteristics of the groups within civil society. Here, I expand Fraser’s theoretical
argument in order to fit it within empirical reality.20
These sectors are comprised of organizations that are connected by the type of goals
they pursue.21 By goals here I mean the desired—not actual—concrete, tangible end-
results of the actions taken by these organizations. These goals are not pre-specified for
a civil society; there is not necessarily a distinct number of subsectors within the civil
20Note that Fraser does make a normative argument. For her, casting the public sphere, especially in
the liberal-democratic mold, as a singular creation damages the counter publics that have sprung into
empirical existence and into conflict with this public sphere. For Fraser, it is normatively as well as
empirically wrong to conceive of the public sphere as one thing, even prescriptively. I do not go as far,
here, I just point out that empirically it does not make sense to treat civil society as a unitary concept.
21Jonas and Morton (2012, 7) talk of the “shared interest, purposes, and values” around which collec-
tive action revolves.
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society space. These goals do not need to be positive, in a normative sense.22 Yet, civil
society can still be divided into four broad sectors that characterize families of goals (the
largest common factor of the goals of the organizations within them):
1. Recreational : The organizations in this sector are primarily concerned with bringing
individuals together for recreational or social reasons. Examples include book clubs,
bowling leagues, and village music associations.
2. Political : These organizations pursue political ends, explicitly or implicitly, and at-
tempt to influence political proceedings. Examples include human rights organiza-
tions, groups that push for the inclusion of women in politics, and non-governmental
organizations that focus on corruption.
3. Economic: This sector revolves around economic pursuits. Labor unions, chambers
of commerce, and professional associations like the APSA inhabit this sector.
4. Religious : Here groups are linked by their religious nature; they speak for and to
the soul. Religious charitable organizations, churches,23 and religious youth groups
are examples of the civil society organizations in this sector.
Each of these sectors can then be further divided into three disparate parts: a regime-
challenging part, comprised of organizations whose goals in some way seek to influence
how a regime carries out policy, a regime-acquiescent part, whose organizations pursue
goals orthogonal to the interests of the regime, and a regime-promoting part,24 whose
organizations pursue goals that seek to promote the goals of the regime as if they were
their own.25 A key point to emphasize is that these sectors can be compared between
22Alagappa posits that civil society organizations operate “in pursuit of the public good (2004a, 32).
It is unclear why that stipulation needs to be met to achieve membership status in civil society. This
issue is further problematized by the fact that the public good is often difficult to establish.
23Churches belong in civil society as they are organizations that bring people together. They often
also have the explicit goal of reaching more people and drawing more converts into the church itself. I
thank Gloria Cheung for pointing this out.
24In some ways, this part may be similar to so-called government organized nongovernmental organi-
zations (GONGOS) (see Cumming, 2010; Naim, 2009). The difference, however, is that these groups do
not need to be sponsored or created by the government or regime.
25Bush (2015) distinguishes between “regime-compatible” and “regime-incompatible” aid programs
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countries, although sectors will by no means be the same size in each country.26 By
regime here I mean, taking from O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 73), the general rules
and structures that impact how a government functions. This approach means that these
three parts will be different given regime-type, by definition. Thus, in most established
democracies, the regime-acquiescent and regime-promoting will be the largest and will
have implicit or explicit pro-democratic positions, and the regime-challenging part might
be anti-democratic or radically democratic.27 In authoritarian regimes, however, the
regime-acquiescent parts of civil society may not take a position on the regime itself
and may look more at local issues (and therefore will make no claims about democratic
values), and regime-promoting parts of civil society may be expressly anti-democratic.
Regime-challenging civil society groups might hold more democratic views, although this
does not have to be the case. There can be regime-challenging civil society groups that
want to implement goals that are just as anti-democratic as those of the current regime.28
The four overarching sectors—each with three parts—are important because one
would expect them to be treated differently, given different regime contexts (see Dimitro-
vova, 2010). While political civil society may be a threat in any authoritarian regime, if
the regime is able to populate political civil society with groups that support it, it may
co-opt this sector in the eyes of the people (see Lorch and Bunk, 2017). In addition,
in the context of democracy assistance, which is a similar point. Cheskin and March (2015) discuss
”consentful contention” and ”dissentful contention,” with the former being contention that does not
challenge the regime but seeks to work within its parameters, which is the mode in which regime-
acquiescent civil society works. See also Lorch and Bunk (2017), Teets (2014), Spires (2011), and Ziegler
(2010) for work that shows why even authoritarian regimes would allow regime acquiescent organizations
to operate.
26Henderson (2003) differentiates between externally-funded and unfunded civil society groups in
Russia. While this is a useful analytic approach to take, in general, this conceptualization applies
to other situations as well, not just newly democratized countries. Another approach could be to divide
civil society into “formal” and “informal” civil society. The issue then becomes a matter of definition
once again. How does one differentiate between formal and informal civil society organizations?
27An alternative terminology would be to use system-challenging, system-acquiescent, and system-
promoting.
28See the section on the tenor of civil society for the the democraticness of a civil society sector, which
is a separate quantity of interest.
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while economic civil society that is too autonomous may be undesirable in some auto-
cratic regimes, it may also be desired in advanced capitalist authoritarian regimes such
as Singapore. In effect, these four sectors are useful. The sectors can certainly bleed into
the other spheres of society; there are political parties that create and fund associations
that carry out programs or provide grants that align with the party’s ideology and goals.
The boundary that defines the civil society space is porous. That said, it is still separate
from the three pillars of society: political society, made up of parties, is not the same as
political civil society.
In many ways, to speak of one political civil society or one religious civil society may
still be too reductive—there is variation within each sector as well. Therefore, within
each of these sectors exist a multitude of subsectors. These subsectors are organizations
who share even concreter goals. For example, the political sector may contain a home-
lessness subsector and a human rights subsector, and the recreational sector may include
a amateur soccer subsector. The subsectors themselves are not so easily defined nor
fixed—the examples here—and later in the paper—are illustrative, not definitive.
The sectors also bleed into one another; labor unions, for example, are often very
political in their purposes and action, although they do most of their work in the eco-
nomic sector. Even supposedly non-political associations such chess clubs may involve
politics—they have leadership selection procedures, rules of order. In addition, civil soci-
ety organizations that ostensibly belong in one sector—such as the Orthodox Church in
Russia, or soccer fan groups in Ukraine—can involve themselves in another sector. These
groups have involved themselves directly in the politics of their respective countries. A
similar logic applies to subsectors. Besides the organizations themselves, civil society
actors can be involved with civil society organizations that span the sectors. Yet, while
life is inherently political, it is not always political in the same way, nor with the same
consequences.
Furthermore, the mere fact that there can be significant overlap between sectors is not
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a problem. While the civil society space can be divided, the civil society organizations
in that space do not have to belong or be fixed in one part of this space. In effect, civil
society is a latent concept, one that can be divided into several latent dimensions (it
can be theorized as looking, to a certain extent, like a multivariate Poisson distribution,
where the number of organizations in a sector governs the density of the distribution).
Yet, the structure that governs to which of these dimensions an organization belongs
is not defined as a mixture in itself. That is to say, an organization does not have to
belong to only one sector (e.g. one dimension of the multivariate Poisson). This would
mean that the structure is partially analogous to that of a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
topic model. Unlike such models, however, also called mixed-membership models, the
membership of a civil society organization to a sector is not sum–to–1. This means that
an organization can belong equally strongly to two different sectors and belonging to one
sector does not decrease an organization’s membership in another sector. In other words
a multiple membership model governs civil society sector membership for organizations.
Spacially, civil society resembles a Venn diagram. The four sectors described above all
overlap, and the lower-level, issue–specific subsectors they contain also overlap within
the overarching domains and overlaps. In the end, however—and what this exercise has
helped underline—the important takeaway is that organizations do have latent (and in
many cases explicit) sector and subsector memberships, which are empirically useful to
know and about which it is useful to theorize.
This reconceptualization of civil society is not revolutionary, although perhaps it has
not been done this way before. Its thrust is to guide researchers, scholars, and policy-
makers by pointing out the various disparate parts of a “civil society.” In addition, it
unifies the discussion of authoritarian civil society and democratic civil society. To a
certain extent, then, this definition is “maximal,” in that it seeks to include all of civil
society as it is. It is not, however, maximal in the “ideal” sense (see Gerring, 2012,
136-137), as a civil society missing one or more sectors that are present in other civil
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societies—even one of the major four—is not any less of a civil society. In this way, this
conceptualization is completely descriptive. This does not mean, however, that it is not
causally useful.
More work needs to be done on how civil society sectors and subsectors interact, in
both authoritarian and democratic contexts. The value in dividing civil society in this
way comes from the fact that the types of organizations within a certain sector may be
different in nature from those involved in another. Combining all different organizations
within civil society glosses over the incredible diversity inherent in it and the variation
that must be studied. Even work which looks at the role civil society can play in author-
itarian regimes, such as that by Lorch and Bunk (2017) and Ziegler (2010), treats civil
society there as one entity. Ziegler (2010), for examples, talks about a “Central Asian
model” of civil society. While it may be possible that different archetypes of civil society
exist, the schema developed here allows us to compare the makeup of civil society within
one overall framework.29 This facilitates the comparison of different “models” of civil
society and the relationship and paths between them. As an extension of this point, real-
izing that civil society has sectors of like-minded—loosely defined—organizations allows
us to investigate the ways in which these sectors interact with with the state and the
actors within it. Civil society groups whose goals do not include challenging the state
directly or whose goals do not threaten the way in which ruling actors pursue their own
interests may be more likely to survive under conditions where political civil society has
been undermined—as has been the case in Russia (Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova,
2017). Finally, differentiating between different sectors in society makes it possible to
identify sectors that are more developed or—a point that will be expanded upon in the
next section—stronger than others.
The causal implications and origins of this descriptive concept also need to be explored
29The problem—really an empirical one—posed by the concept of “models” of civil society is where
different models exist when. Is there an authoritarian type of civil society and a democratic type, defined
distinctly by the regime type? If so, when does the model change? Is the model changeable?
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further. Clearly, the assumption and empirical fact is that not all civil societies are the
same. Yet, they are also clearly different in multiple dimensions, a realization that this
definition helps make possible. As such, the description, the static “make-up” of civil
society, in and of itself is interesting. What leads to a certain distribution of civil society
sectors in a given country? What political factors impact the size of civil society sectors?
This definition, which investigates civil society in a purely descriptive way, helps us realize
that these questions must still be asked.
Civil Society Strength
Civil society is a spatial and organizational concept. Civil society strength, on the
other hand, to borrow from Bayesian statistics, is a quantity of interest. Once we have
observed the civil society distribution, we can derive quantities of interest from it, of
which strength is just one.30,31 In other words, civil society strength comes out of the
state of civil society—civil society itself, as a concept, means too many things for us to
effectively measure it.32 As such, it must be addressed explicitly and separately from civil
society itself. In this section, I lay out an approach to thinking of civil society strength.
At the same time, I will discuss a separate quantity of interest that I term the tenor
of civil society—how democratic a civil society sector is—as it is empirically useful to
discuss in connection with civil society strength, although it is not directly related to it.
Civil society strength is empirically interesting, as much scholarship into the topic
30Note that this is not how I will go about operationalizing civil society strength—this is because
performing a census, or even a survey of all civil society groups within a society is very difficult. I am
working on projects that attempt to do so with individual sectors in individual countries.
31Examples of other quantities of interest could be civil society health, civil society robustness, or civil
society density. These are different from strength in that they emphasize different aspects of civil society
that one may consider important.
32Measuring civil society, full stop, makes little sense without thinking of quantities of interest. Mea-
suring civil society is not the same as measuring democracy. Regardless of the actual measurement
strategy used, measures of democracy have the scale inherently built into the concept. Higher—or
lower, if using Freedom House, for example—scores indicates more democracy. What would a higher or
lower score of civil society indicate? Civilness? Many measures of “civil society” often have normative
ideals already built into the conceptualization—something that is only true for measures of democracy
in the sense that the measurers have opinions on what should actually constitute democracy.
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has alternatively theorized that various understandings of civil society strength are, for
different reasons, favorably related to democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens,
1992; Putnam, 1993; Diamond, 1999; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000), that they are in
fact unfavorable to it (Huntington, 2000 [1968]; Berman, 1997), or that it depends on the
context (Armony, 2004). A better understanding of civil society strength would allow us
to reevaluate those theories.
What then defines strength? And what characterizes a strong civil society sector? In
certain settings, defining strength by outcomes makes sense. A weightlifter who can lift
250 pounds is strong; one who can lift only 20 pounds is weak. Civil society strength is
not one of those settings. Assessing civil society strength by outcomes is not theoretically
sound; there are numerous factors that can impact the “success” of a civil society sector.
To say that a civil society sector is strong when it has achieved its goals—for example,
to say simply that political civil society in a country with a competitive authoritarian
regime is strong because popular protest pushed an authoritarian leader out of power—
ignores the fact that intervening variables can both confound and inflate the civil society’s
sector natural strength. To continue the example, if international pressure buttressed the
civil society groups artificially—that is to say, if authoritarian leaders acquiesced to the
demands of civil society only because of extreme top-down pressure—civil society strength
could be unrelated to the outcome. In such a case, if a civil society had actually been
weak, it would not be a shock to see the status quo reassert itself, perhaps given some
liberalization, once the international pressure dissipates. It would also be wrong to say
that a civil society sector is strong because of how productive it is. While productivity,
interpreted as the number of civil society actions in which a sector partakes, is certainly
an important quantity of interest, it is likely that it is also dependent on civil society
strength, as the quality and reach of the actions would seem to be essential.
I define civil society strength as civil society’s capacity to pursue its goals. A strong
civil society will be better suited to pursuing its goals than a weak civil society. As should
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be clear at this stage, to speak of civil society strength without making reference to civil
society sectors would be problematic. While the strength of civil society as a whole can be
assessed, the value in building a top-down approach to civil society strength is dubious,
as the only characteristic truly binding all of civil society together is the association of
civil society actors.33 Instead, we can speak of the strength—and the subindicators of
strength to come below—of sectors and subsectors.34 Only once we have an understanding
of strong civil society sectors or subsectors can we move upwards again to look at civil
society as a whole. An importance consequence of this conceptualization is that it is
not directly organization based—strength is a characteristic of a sector, not of individual
organizations. This does not mean that we cannot speak of strong and weak organizations
using a similar vocabulary. In fact, civil society strength is full realized only via civil
society organizations and their relationships. I expand on this idea below. Yet, while
the strength of individual organizations is empirically interesting, this conceptualization
focuses on sectors as more manageable way of breaking down the monolithic approaches
to civil society.
This definition revolves around two key ideas: capacity and goals. Goals come from
the definition of civil society and its sectors. As such, beyond the idea that civil society
organizations want their interests represented in action, “goals” is a sector-dependent—
and even organization-dependent—concept. Capacity is thus the essential element. In
effect, capacity is synonymous with strength. This does not mean that more specific
goals cannot vary within a sector, and that this cannot have important implications for
strength, as can be seen below.
Drawing on the insights of scholars such as Ishkanian (2008, 2014) and Lee (2016),
I draw up three factors that influence a civil society sector’s capacity for action—its
33In addition, Fraser (1990) forcefully argues that understanding the make-up of the various parts of
civil society provides more explanatory power than just looking at civil society as a whole.
34This definition of strength applies equally to sectors or subsectors. For simplicity’s sake, I use
“sectors” in this section, but each “sector” could and should be taken as being followed by “or subsector.”
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cohesiveness, its embeddedness35, and its bureaucratic capital—and one that conditions
that capacity—its environment.
Cohesiveness captures the idea that a strong civil society sector is made up of organi-
zations that work together to achieve their common goal. As Bunce and Wolchik (2011)
explain in their book on democratizing elections in Eastern Europe, political civil society
groups that were able to work better with opposition movements were more successful in
pushing for political change. Civil society organizations and civil society that are more
strongly interconnected will characterize stronger civil society. Because the organizations
in a tightly connected sector can pool resources and coordinate actions and campaigns,
they are better able to push for change that brings them closer to their goals. A sec-
tor populated by less unified civil society organization will be weaker. If organizations
cannot or do not cooperate—whether simply because they are unaware of like-minded
organizations’ existence or because their more immediate goals and the methods they
use to pursue them do not agree—they are less likely to be able to bring their plans to
fruition. This means that more fractured civil society sectors are not as strong as more
unified civil society sectors. It also implies that a civil society sector that is split into
two ideological camps—as may be the case in countries with two main parties—is not
as strong as one that is not split in this way. This is because in such split civil society
sectors, the two aligned groups each spend energy and effort to combat the other group,
limiting their forward, goal-oriented thrust. If we think in terms of networks, a civil
society sector is strongest when its nodes (organizations) are tightly linked. To a certain
extent, this conceptualization approaches the social capital framework: in rather crude
35I borrow the terms “cohesiveness” and “embeddedness” from Lee (2016), who discusses civil society
in the context of labor unions resisting retrenchment in advanced capitalist democracies. Lee, however,
conceptualizes cohesiveness and embeddedness differently, and relates them to civil society differently,
than I do here. He uses the terms to refer to labor unions, not civil society in general; cohesiveness
is defined as “labor organizations’ political ties with parties — the policy/government sphere,” while
embeddedness refers to “labor organization’s ties with civic organizations” (52). Lee also states that “co-
hesiveness and embeddedness are not clearly differentiated during the protean stages of the authoritarian
or pre-democracy eras” (52); my conceptualization of strength applies to all political regimes.
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terms, sectors with higher social capital will be stronger.
Cohesiveness is not enough to make a strong civil society sector. As Ishkanian (2008,
2014), points out with her discussion of “genetically engineered civil society” in the
democratizing countries of Eastern Europe, many of these countries have civil society
organizations that look incredibly well interconnected with one another. The problem,
however, is that these organizations are not well connected to the fabric of society—they
are not seen as legitimate civil society organizations by the people they are supposed
to serve or on whom they would ideally call upon for support.36 Mendelson and Glenn
support this analysis: “in nearly every case [of NGO created by external funds], investi-
gators found that the new [civil society created] institutions had weak links to their own
societies” (2002, 22).
As such, a stronger civil society sector will be characterized by organizations that are
more embedded in society. The embeddedness of a civil society sector is derived from two
sources: the extent to which citizens participate in and view civil society organizations as
legitimate, and the extent to which organizations are linked to other elements in society.
First, strong civil society organizations may have a deeper well of support, and thus
will be capable of executing actions with more weight. Civil society organizations can
be strong even without active participation by members of the society, however, as the
sense of legitimacy accorded to civil society organizations that are seen as operating on
behalf of the people will allow these organizations to act more forcefully. This part of
embeddedness is a function of the size of the portion of society from which a sector
draws its support. In other words, a civil society sector that is tightly linked to a small
portion of society will not be as strong as a civil society sector tightly linked to a larger
portion of society. Second, a civil society sector that has established solid links to other
organizations—such as parties—and other sectors—such as th church—will be harder to
36Focusing only on these organizations in discussions of civil society leads us to forget about those
civil society organizations that are in fact better connected to the people, such as nationalistic groups.
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deny when push comes to shove. In addition, a civil society sector filled by civil society
organizations that rely on a wider arrange of funding sources, especially domestic funding
sources—as opposed to the “grant eaters” that inhabit many transitioning countries—will
be stronger than one where funding comes from only several sources.37
Missing from the concepts of cohesiveness and embeddedness are the organizations
themselves. Up to this point, I have looked more at the connections between orga-
nizations and society. However, there are certain characteristics of the organizations
that rationally impact their capacity to pursue their goals. Organizations, and net-
works of organizations, that are better organized—with clearer structure and definition
of responsibilities—and better led—be it by savvier leaders or ones with better training—
will be able to pursue goals more effectively than poorly led groups.38 I combine this
aspect of organizations and sectors under the concept of the bureaucratic capital of a
sector. A better-run organization—and by extension, a sector or subsector made up
of better-run organizations—will be better situated to establish connections with other
organizations and might be better placed to embed itself in society (although the connec-
tion here is not as clear). As such, bureaucratic capital can be expected to covary with
cohesiveness and to some extent embeddedness. It is still a distinct concept, however, as
the relationships are not guaranteed, especially as bureaucratic capital can be expected to
change more quickly than cohesiveness. Together, bureaucratic capital, embeddedness,
and cohesiveness determine the raw strength of a sector.
The final, crucial, conditioning element of civil society strength is the civil society envi-
ronment. Here I draw most directly on the work and ideas of Fioramonti and Koninykhina
(2015) and the principles of the USAID Sustainability Index. The environment has three
core parts: first, the legal and institutional environment, particularly how open or closed
37Perhaps until recently, the guns rights sector in the United States of America, spearheaded by the
NRA, has been an example of an extremely strong civil society sector. It has connections to other
groups, it has connections to candidates, it has connections to businesses.
38Note that this is not the financial capacity of a organization or sector. This is included in embed-
dedness and in the environment aspects of civil society strength.
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it is; second, the trust environment, which reflects level of social trust in a country and
willingness to participate in organizations; and third, the resource environment, which
determines the type of funds and support on which civil society groups in a sector can
rely. This aspect of civil society strength is different from the previous three because it
is not a quality derived directly from civil society organizations themselves, and one over
which they have little direct control.39 Environment is different in that it only serves
to provide a rough and certainly not impervious ceiling for civil society strength. As I
mentioned above, the civil society space can be squeezed and limited. Yet, just as co-
hesiveness and embeddedness are characteristics of civil society sectors, so can the civil
society environment be different for different sectors. Different parts of civil society space
can be closed off while others remain more open. In the same way, citizens can show
more trust or belief toward civil society organizations that belong to a certain sector.
A civil society sector that is being constrained will most likely not have the potential
to be as strong as one that is not as constrained. This is because the possible set of
actions available to it will be lower, while its ability to establish connections with other
groups and with other civil society organizations will be negatively affected. As such,
environment conditions the possibility of strength, but may not impact it directly. A civil
society sector will be strongest when it is made up of cohesive, embedded organizations
in an open civil society environment. At the same time, an open civil society sector does
not guarantee a strong civil society sector. While the legal conditions for strong civil
society may exist, if civil society organizations are not well connected to each other and
to individuals and other societal elements, that civil society sector these organizations
make up will not be strong.
This definition of civil society strength does not change across sectors, even in the
recreational sector. An adult amateur soccer league, made up of individual soccer teams,
will be able to organize a better tournament and thus provide entertainment to its
39Although the goal of a civil society sector could be to expand the civil society space, of course.
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members if it can coordinate with other recreational associations, including other soccer
leagues, and if it can draw on a connection with the community for support and players.
Performance against the goal is then impacted by the local rules and regulations that
govern amateur sports in the area, the willingness of individuals to associate with others,
and the money available from the player base and from the firms and other associations
in the area that may seek to support the league.
The approach to civil society strength laid out here avoids the necessity of using
directly observable actions in order to assess civil society strength, which can be a flawed
assessment strategy, as addressed above. Instead, civil society strength can then be used
as a predictor to assess the impact of strength on action, which is really what many
theorists of civil society and democratization desire when they discuss the influence of
civil society on democratization.
A Note on the Tenor of Civil Society
As discussed in the second section, theorists of democratization, such as Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens (1992), Diamond (1999), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), of-
ten cast civil society as an inherently positive concept. It is pro-democracy, it helps hold
rulers accountable, and it seeks to push against the regime in autocratic settings and to
support the regime (or seek to improve it) in democratic settings. This is a needlessly
limiting approach to civil society, however, as some theorists have pointed out (see Ar-
mony, 2004; White, 2004), and I have taken great care to conceptualize civil society and
civil society strength as removed from questions of democraticness. At the same time
this is an empirically important concept. We can only ask questions about the impact of
civil society strength on democracy (or other outcomes of interest) if we accept that not
all civil society organizations support democracy—this allows us to evaluate civil society
in a common framework. I cast the democraticness of civil society as the tenor of civil
society.
The tenor of a civil society sector is the extent to which it is pro-democracy. Tenor
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again grows from the civil society organizations themselves in simple aggregate terms—
the more civil society organizations in a sector are pro-democracy, the more pro-democratic
the sector. The tenor does not refer to the organization of the groups themselves—that
is to say, this is not a description of how democratic a group’s practices are, as the two
are not intrinsically linked.40 This does imply that sectors can be at odds with one
another; the economic sector could be more pro-democratic, while the political sector
could be more anti-democratic. This may have empirical consequences. It also does have
an implication for civil society strength: a civil society sector that is split in terms of
the extent to which its constituent organizations are pro-democracy would probably not
be very cohesive. In addition, it also provides a useful heuristic when comparing civil
societies—and civil sociey sectors—as a whole, as it is somewhat more straightforward to
interpret than the regime-affinity discussed above. Nevertheless, I do not include tenor in
my definition of civil society strength, as there are many reasons a sector could be split.
In addition, the tenor of a sector, while not normative per se, has normative implications,
which could muddle the definition of society needlessly.
To summarize the preceding sections: Civil society is a space, filled by civil society
actors who congregate in civil society organizations, which have certain goals. These
organizations do not all inhabit the same space. Organizations with similar goals can be
grouped into sectors. The strength of these sectors can be assessed: a civil society sector
is strongest when its organizations are cohesive, when its organizations are connected to
the people and to other parts of society, when its organizations are well-organized, and
when the portion of civil society space that sector occupies is open. Sectors have a tenor,
which describes the extent to which they are pro-democratic.
40See Armony (2004) on how anti-system civil society groups in the United States can operate demo-
cratically.
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APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH: TWO VIGNETTES
In this section, I discuss two civil society sectors in two different contexts—the United
States of America and Armenia; a democracy, and a hybrid regime—in order to display
both the versatility of the tools presented above and to show variation on the assessment
strategy proposed. The goal is not to make causal claims; instead this sections is de-
scriptive in nature—I will demonstrate the types of relationships that need to be studied
further, using the framework I have drawn up in this paper. In doing so, however, I point
out the possibility of causal relationships.
The Far-Right Subsector in the United States of America
The Southern Poverty Law Center defines the alt-right as “a set of far-right ideolo-
gies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack by
multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white
people and ‘their’ civilization” (Alt-Right, n.d.). The alt-right is generally seen as part of
the far-right, which also generally includes the “Ku Klux Klan,” “white supremacists,”
“neo-nazis,” “white nationalists,” and “neo-confederates” (Merelli, n.d.). There are many
who argue convincingly that there is no real distinction between the alt-right and the
far-right, except perhaps in small degrees of activity and ideological extremism, as the
effects desired and goals are similar (see, for example, Ember, 2016; Mohajer, 2017).
While the distinction can be valuable for analysis of the threads within a civil society
sector, I use the far-right here to refer to all such groups that hold pro-White identity
values.
How does the far-right fit into civil society?41 As its definition states, although it is
41Folding the far-right into American civil society is by no means an innovation here. Armony’s entire
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in many ways most important to see the far-right as an ideology, that ideology is held
and expressed by a series of groups and individuals who interact with one another and
other groups and individuals in the United States and abroad. While the far-right makes
claims on the state, it is not part of the state.42 It is, also, not part of the market,
nor a familial institution, nor an organized religion. As such, it operates in the space
between these four pillars, dependent on the interaction of individuals in this space.
While participation in actual far-right activities may not be that high—it is noteworthy
that almost all far-right events see more counter protesters than far-right participants
(Moskowitz, 2017)—it is true that far-right events are not the focal point of this sector,
with the vast majority of far-right participants being active mostly online (Squirrell, 2017;
Alt-Right, n.d.).Under which of the four umbrella sectors does the far-right belong? To
the extent that the far-right has a goal, it can be seen as turning the state into a pro-
white-identity state. As such, the far-right belongs to political civil society. Because the
far-right advocates for a radical change to the way the state should be defined, the far-
right can be considered a regime-challenging civil society subsector. It is anti-democratic
in the sense that democracy represents the inclusion of all. Therefore, the far-right can be
considered an anti-democratic, regime-challenging subsector of the political civil society
sector.
How strong is this sector? The answer, via the organizational lens taken here, is not
very, although the three dimensions of raw strength show somewhat divergent situations.
The far-right is not cohesive. It is embedded in a certain part of the US public, although
it is not as well embedded within the overall structure of US society.
The far-right is not united, organizationally speaking. The issue is, in part, ideo-
logical, with varying degrees of anti-democraticness, anti-semitism, and anti-immigrant
attitudes in its ranks (Ford 2017; Squirrel 2017). Another related reason is the inability of
2004 book deals with the subject.
42Some of its members may be involved or were involved with the Trump administration, such as
Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon.
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any of the far-right leaders to cooperate and pool resources, often for ideological reasons.
As such, the public face of the far-right, even though the election of Trump should have
spurred them on, has fractured into disparate factions. The fall-out occurred as soon as
the “Deploraball” that was supposed to celebrate the election of President Trump (Gray,
2017). In general, there is infighting among the intellectual leadership of the sector (see
Hayden, 2018; Hatewatch Staff, 2017; Mudde, 2018; Pearce, 2016). As such, there is little
to no cohesion in this subsector. In addition, this gives an idea of the lack of bureaucratic
capital that can be found in the far right.
The far-right is partially embedded in society. The views it promotes seem to res-
onate strongly with a not insignificant portion of the American public. A Washington
Post/ABC poll carried out after the attack of a member of the far-right on counter-
protesters found that about 10% of Americans support the alt-right.43. The online pres-
ence of alt-right and far-right is significant as well, especially on the website reddit,
where engagement in the The Donald subreddit is very high (Martin, 2017; Squirrell,
2017). Furthermore, preliminary research shows that racial-resentment is strong in the
areas that voted for Donald Trump (Kreitzer and Smith, 2018) and that racial resent-
ment is a stronger predictor of voting for Donald Trump than economic factors (Green
and McElwee, 2018; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2017). The United States is clearly not a
post-racism society, and pro-white identity rhetoric found a foothold among white Amer-
icans during the 2016 election campaign. This embeddedness is partial in the sense that
the far-right is not—yet—well-connected politically. For mainstream Republicans, the
far-right remains anathema, even as they court its members as voters. In addition, the
far-right as a civil society sector is isolated within US political civil society and US civil
society as a whole.
Although my goal here is not to make causal claims, it is important to note two
points. First, the election and campaign of Donald Trump seemed to re-invigorate hate
43http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1190a1TrumpandCharlottesville.pdf
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groups in the United States, which rose from a ten-year low of 784 in 2014 to 954 in
2017, as counted by the Southern Poverty Law Center Hate Map (2017). It is hard to
argue that the far-right sector contributed significantly to the election of Donald Trump;
he simply appealed to the same base.44 Although cursory, this point helps demonstrate
the necessity of separating outcomes from causes when speaking of civil society. A fairly
active and vocal far-right sector does not mean that the far-right sector was strong or
effective. Second, and related, is the fact that the far-right has not managed to accomplish
much since the 2016 election. Many individuals with connections to the alt-right, such
as Steve Bannon, have been pushed out of the White House. In terms of policy, the
Trump “administration’s policies have been mostly conservative (on steroids) rather than
radical-right” (Mudde, 2018). The far-right civil society sector is not strong, due to its
lack of cohesion and its split-embedded nature, and that may help explain why it has not
managed to achieve the changes it desires (but see Section for an analysis of why it may
be more difficult for it to do so in general). Unlike in Europe, where the far-right/radical
right has gained footholds in several party systems, the US far-right does not have a
party organization to help it organize politically either. Any semblance of strength it
does have, however, it derives from deep-seated affinities in a subset of the United States
population.
It would seem that the civil society environment would be the same for all civil so-
ciety sectors and subsectors in the United States of America, and as such, the far-right
would be affected by the environment in the same way as other civil society subsectors .
This is implied by the environment measure provided by the CIVICUS Enabling Envi-
ronment Index, which gives the United States the 10th best score out of the 109 countries
evaluated.45 In fact, however, the civil society environment is—fortunately—generally
44It is undeniable that the online arm of the far-right, particularly the alt-right, helped move the
conversation in Donald Trump’s favor (Martin, 2017). However, even here, the causality is stretched.
The far-right as an ideology certainly impacted the 2016 election. It would be difficult to establish,
however, that the alt-right organizationally affected the outcome.
45EEI data available only for 2013: http://www.civicus.org/eei/
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hostile to far-right organizations, turning against them particularly after the events in
Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017. Advertisers have abandoned far-right media
organizations such as Breitbart over their reporting (Cox, 2017), and far-right websites
and groups have found it harder and harder to raise funds online through traditional
financial platforms such as Patreon and GoFundMe (Carson, 2017). Although the far-
right has attempted to provide its own fundraising infrastructure, it has mostly been
unsuccessful (Robertson, 2017; Roose, 2017). In other words, the environment is not
uniform, just as civil society is not monolithic. This is not just the case in democratic
regimes; in a similar way, government funded and supported civil society groups such
as Nashi in Russia operate in a very different civil society environment than those that
are not supported by the government. While this may seem obvious in some ways, the
relationship between how individuals view these different types of organizations, given
the disparate environments in which they operate, must still be explored.
Civil Society in Armenia
Traditional conceptualizations of civil society are easy to accommodate under the
framework developed here. That which is usually termed “civil society” in Armenia by
donors and scholars studying civil society in Eastern Europe is political civil society,
because the greatest attention is paid to groups that attempt to affect the policy space,
as Freedom House’s country reports for Armenia46 and a recent European Union grant
initiative designed to support civil society capacity in Armenia47 attest. Furthermore,
because of their definition of civil society and the hope that it will serve as a democratiz-
ing force, they generally focus on the regime-challenging portion of political civil society.
This can be explicit, on part of the civil society organizations themselves—for example,
the Center for the Development of Civil Society, based in Yerevan, lists “foster[ing] the
46https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/armenia
47https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/24502/eu-continues-support-development-and-
strengthening-civil-society-armenia en. The grant initiative explicitly aims to “[i]ncrease monitoring
capacity of civil society” and “[i]ncrease public accountability.”
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concept of democracy and civil society” as one of its core objectives (Center for the De-
velopment of Civil Society, n.d.). It can also be implicit, as in the case of the Strong
CSOs for Stronger Armenia organization, which promises “to increas[e] the capacities
of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Armenia as independent development actors to
make them more competent, more responsive to citizens’ needs, and proactively support-
ing the country’s development through practical, project-based approaches” (STRONG
Civil Society Organisations for Stronger Armenia, 2016). In a hybrid regime, the ability
of organizations that are not government-sponsored to respond to citizens’ needs and
operate independently of the government is a threat to the regime.
How strong is the regime-challenging political civil society sector in Armenia? Aca-
demic analysis and country reports from donor organizations shed significant light on the
subject. In general terms, the political sector is not very cohesive. According to the Asian
Development Bank analysis of Armenian political civil society from 2011, “fragmenta-
tion and competition among CSOs occur frequently.” As may be expected, Armenian
political civil society does not do well in terms of embeddedness. Most Armenians are
not aware of the existence of the NGOs that should assist them (Paturyan, 2009). Ishka-
nian (2008) has shown that the Armenian NGO sector, primarily supported by outside
sources, is disconnected from Armenian society and not responsive to it, and Paturyan
reaffirms that “[o]verall the organisational sector of civil society can be described as fairly
institutionalized but detached from the broader public” (2014, 6).
In the past decade, perhaps as a response to this lack of connection, civil society ac-
tivists have turned to a new form of civil society organization, called “civic initiatives,”
which are “various issue-oriented, horizontally structured groups of individual activists
united around a common, often very specific, cause (prevention of construction in a pub-
lic park, preservation of an architecturally valuable building, protests against a new mine
...)” (Paturyan, 2014, 5). As Paturyan reports, these civic initiatives have had some suc-
cess where formal NGOs have not. The Freedom House Nations in Transit Report for 2017
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also commented on the rise of these types of organizations noting that “[i]nterestingly,
these initiatives were predominantly grassroots, crowd-funded, often unrelated to formal
NGOs” (Danielyan, 2017). The 2018 report also notes that ”[t]he limited ability of the
formal civil society sector to influence policy, and the government’s continued neglect
of sources of public discontent, has elevated the role of more nontraditional activism,”
clarifying that many of these are ”antisystemic” in character (Aghekyan, 2018). Given
the way strength has been presented in this paper, it should come as no surprise that
those civil society organizations that have a closer link to Armenian civil society would
be able to push more effectively for political change. Yet, while this development may
be positive in terms of goals (of the civic initatives) accomplished, it also has worrying
implications for democracy in Armenia.
The conceptualizations of civil society and civil society formulated here may help shed
light on why the connection between civil society and democracy can at times appear
very weak. This is because it helps clarify some of the relationships and developments
necessary for civil society to push for democratization, which traditional approaches of
civil society often ignore. By nature, it is harder for a national level sector (which
the political, economic, recreational, and religious sectors are) to be cohesive. This is
because the higher the level of analysis, the more difficult it will be for groups that share
a common general goal to cooperate. Pulling from the case of Armenia (and also, in fact
Ukraine, which are two Eastern European and Eurasian countries traditionally seen as
having relatively strong civil societies), what this may mean in terms of the relationship
between civil society and democratization is that it becomes exceedingly difficult to agree
on the direction democratization should take. This may lead organizations to focus on
smaller issues, which seem more manageable, as has been the case in Armenia. Yet this
splintering of the political civil society sector into issue sectors also impedes the ability
for groups in political civil society to positively impact democratic quality—cohesion
across the sector becomes more difficult. In short, civil society is stronger when it is
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issue-focused. However, the connection between issues and overall systemic problems is
tenuous—the number of small issues that must be addressed in order to push a country
toward democratic institutions is enormous. It is possible that civil society is important
for the practice of democracy, but that it is only indirectly related to democratization.48
Political civil society as a whole, as seen from the donor perspective, is at cross-purposes
in important ways with the issue sectors it contains.
In addition, the location of pro-democracy groups within overall civil society, and
their end-goals, makes it more difficult to impact democratization. In terms of values,
goals, and methods, the far-right in the United States and the pro-democracy civil so-
ciety groups in Armenia are far apart. In their orientation to the system in which they
are located, however, they do share some similarities, in that both sectors are regime-
challenging. These similarities may shed further light on respective political developments
in each country. Regime-challenging parties that seek to change the very nature of the
regime have to agree on the direction that the new regime will take, which, as the preced-
ing paragraph points out, is difficult. Negative coalitions (Beissinger, 2013) are possible,
of course, if the conditions are right. But cohesion is still important even in negative
coalitions—and anti-something coalitions are weaker than pro-something coalitions, as
the difference between the Ukrainian Orange and Euromaidan revolutions seems to show.
48Although this is tentative, it may also be that functioning civil society organizations in hybrid
regimes can delay democratization because they can diffuse citizen dissatisfaction with the government
(Lorch and Bunk, 2017; Teets, 2014). It would depend on how the people react to these organizations,
and to whom they attribute their success.
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CONCLUSION
Civil society is a nebulous concept. Yet the interaction of groups and individuals in the
civil space is a crucial component of democracy, democratization, and authoritarianism.
Unfortunately, most of the literature on civil society has taken a normative approach to
the concept, either explicitly or implicitly. This, in turn, has affected how researchers have
gone about assessing certain key aspects of civil society, such as civil society strength.
When one investigates the conceptual underpinnings of these measures, it becomes clear
that they do not alway capture the aspects of civil society that seem to be important.
In addition, it is hard to connect theories of civil society to these measures, making it
difficult to say if research done using them answers the questions researchers are asking.
As a contribution to the literature and in order to help relieve some of the tensions
inherent in it, in this paper, I have presented an approach to civil society strength that
is not based on normative assumptions and is not functional in nature.
On the path toward this novel approach, it was necessary to reevaluate the concept
itself, leading to several conclusions. First, civil society is not monolithic. It is comprised
of civil society organizations whose goals can be used to combine them into different
sectors of civil society. Each sector—and by extension civil society as many-part-entity—
can be further divided into a regime-challenging part, a regime-acquiescent part, and a
regime-promoting group. Finally, each sector has a tenor, which describes the extent to
which a sector is democratic, in terms of values
This definition of civil society makes understanding civil society strength easier. Civil
society strength is a sector-based concept, and is defined as the ability of a sector to
pursue its goals. The strength of a sector is determined by the cohesiveness of civil
society organizations—the extent to which they are connected and cooperate—within
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that sector. It is also determined by how embedded the civil society organizations in that
sector are in society—both in terms of how individuals and other civil society actors see
them and of how connected civil society organizations in that sector are to other sectors
and other institutionalized elements of society, such as political parties. Finally, strength
is also impacted by the bureaucratic capital of the sector—how well run the organizations
in it are. Embeddedness, cohesion, and bureaucratic capital make it easier for a civil
society sector to achieve its goal by facilitating collective action. Although traditional
conceptions of civil society capacity are important—including sources of funding and
financial viability—this approach to civil society strength hypothesizes that there are
other important factors involved in civil society’s capacity for action.
Although they may be descriptive in nature, the vignettes do contribute to the study
of civil society beyond providing an example for the analysis of civil society strength.
They also provide insight into how civil society in authoritarian regimes is different from
civil society in democratic regimes, and how conceiving of civil society in a standard,
normative, monolithic way masks aspects of civil society that may be consequential for
democratization. In democratic polities, the majority of civil society sectors will be made
up of pro-democratic regime-acquiescent or regime-promoting groups. In the standard
understanding of civil society, the groups in these sectors attempt to influence policy.
In democratic regimes, it makes sense to divide civil society into policy subsectors. In
authoritarian regimes, however, standard conceptions of civil society focus on the pro-
democracy political regime-challenging sector. This sector must attempt to impact policy
and affect regime change. In effect, standard conceptions of civil society ask much more
of “civil society” in authoritarian regimes than it does of “civil society” in democratic
regimes. It makes sense that pro-democracy, political civil society sectors in authoritarian
regimes are “weaker” compared to similar sectors in democratic regimes because agreeing
on how to challenge the authoritarian ruler and on what to make out of the country is
difficult. In addition, because these groups tend to be newer, and often did not grow
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organically, they have little connection to society, which is reflected in the Armenia
vignette. The insights provided by the vignettes thus serve to highlight once again that
much remains to be done, empirically, with respect to civil society.
This approach to civil society strength underpins a new research agenda. A quanti-
tative, but still observational, application of the assessment proposed here would involve
network analysis of civil society sectors in order to measure cohesion, and survey-based
network analysis of a country’s citizens in order to measure embeddedness (see Calvo and
Murillo, 2012). In this study, it would be important to measure the strength of a variety
of sectors—those that receive donor-funding, those that are pro-democracy, those that
are nationalist, etc; the nature of civil society must be respected. This can be combined
with the study of democracy assistance and international aid in variety of ways to extend
the qualitative research done by Henderson (2003) and Ishkanian (2008, 2014). How do
the networks—both of the organizations and of the people—change and develop after an
organization receives resources from abroad? Earlier work indicates that these sectors
will grow more insular and disconnected, but will this always be the case? Does the
regime-context matter?
It may be preemptive to sketch out hypotheses at this stage, but several do come
to mind: if the environment serves as a conditioning element as specified above, then
network growth should be more impaired in a more closed environment. In addition, in
certain contexts, network node proliferation should actually lead to lower strength, as
it is more difficult to solve the collective action problem that can thwart cohesion (e.g.
Olson, 1971). It is also possible to theorize that cohesion might be more important in
more democratic regimes, while embeddedness may be more important in non-democratic
regimes, due to the fact that there are other resources and connections available to civil
society organizations in democratic regimes. Reaching even further afield, it may be that
embeddedness plays an important role in terms of backsliding. If pro-democratic civil
society sectors are not embedded, but anti-democratic ones are, then it may be more
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likely that a country will backslide.
The conceptualization of civil society and the novel approach to civil society strength
proposed here offer a new avenue of research and represent a new lens through which
to investigate the relationship between politics and civil society, and civil society and
individuals.
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